Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
33 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2000
There are 2 versions of this paper
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
Abstract
This paper investigates the reaction of stock prices to enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Based on a sample of 489 high-technology firms, we find that the PSLRA was wealth-increasing, on average, and that the market reaction was more positive for firms at greatest risk of being sued in a securities class action. However, we also show that the PSLRA was less beneficial for firms likely to be the subject of a meritorious lawsuit. Collectively, our evidence implies that shareholders generally benefit from restrictions on private securities litigation, although these benefits are mitigated when other mechanisms for curbing fraudulent activity are inadequate.
JEL Classification: M41, K22, G12, G14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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