Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests

65 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2013 Last revised: 28 Jan 2015

See all articles by Vyacheslav Fos

Vyacheslav Fos

Boston College - Department of Finance

Margarita Tsoutsoura

Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 21, 2013

Abstract

This paper shows that proxy contests have a significant adverse effect on careers of incumbent directors. Following a proxy contest, directors experience a significant decline in number of directorships not only in the targeted company, but also in other non-targeted companies. The results are established using the universe of all proxy contests during 1996-2010. To establish that this effect of proxy contests is causal, we use within-firm variation in directors' exposure to proxy contests and exploit the predetermined schedule of staggered boards that only allows a fraction of directors to be nominated for election every year. We find that nominated directors relative to non-nominated ones lose 45% more seats on other boards. We discuss that this pattern can be expected if proxy contest mechanism imposes a significant career cost on incumbent directors.

Keywords: Proxy contests, Directors, Corporate governance, Agency problem

JEL Classification: G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Fos, Vyacheslav and Tsoutsoura, Margarita, Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests (October 21, 2013). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Volume 114, Issue 2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2293953 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2293953

Vyacheslav Fos

Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )

Carroll School of Management
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States

Margarita Tsoutsoura (Contact Author)

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
766
rank
29,320
Abstract Views
4,002
PlumX