Forthcoming in Management Science
70 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2013 Last revised: 22 Jan 2016
Date Written: January 22, 2015
What explains variability in norms of cooperation across organizations and cultures? One answer comes from the internalization of norms prescribing behavior that is typically successful under the institutions that govern one’s daily life. These norms are then carried over into atypical situations beyond the reach of institutions. Here we experimentally demonstrate such spillovers. First, we immerse subjects in environments that do or do not support cooperation using repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Afterwards, we measure their intrinsic prosociality in one-shot games. Subjects from environments that support cooperation are more prosocial, more likely to punish selfishness, and more generally trusting. Furthermore, these effects are most pronounced among subjects who use heuristics, suggesting that intuitive processes play a key role in the spillovers we observe. Our findings help to explain variation in one-shot anonymous cooperation, linking this intrinsically motivated prosociality to the externally imposed institutional rules experienced in other settings.
Keywords: Prosociality, culture, norms, cooperation, altruism, punishment, trust
JEL Classification: D03, Z10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Peysakhovich, Alexander and Rand, David G., Habits of Virtue: Creating Norms of Cooperation and Defection in the Laboratory (January 22, 2015). Forthcoming in Management Science. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2294242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2294242