The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission

51 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2000

See all articles by John M. de Figueiredo

John M. de Figueiredo

Duke University School of Law; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Emerson H. Tiller

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2000

Abstract

This paper examines the amount and organization of lobbying (internal organization vs. trade association) by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and limitations of the collective action theories and transaction cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of over 900 lobbying contacts covering 101 issues at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in early 1998. We find that the structure and conduct of large firm lobbying at the FCC is consistent with the predictions of transaction costs theories and the main results of collective action theories. However, large firms do not change their behavior drastically as structures arise to remedy the free rider problem. Small firms show no sensitivity to collective action issues or transaction cost issues in the organization or amount of their lobbying, but they do lobby less when having to reveal proprietary information. In sum, large firms behave largely consistent with theoretical predictions, while small firms do not.

JEL Classification: K2, L5

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M. and Tiller, Emerson H., The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission (May 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=229484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229484

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
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Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

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Emerson H. Tiller

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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