Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2295856
 


 



Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth


Erin Johnson


Wellesley College - Center for Research on Women

M. Marit Rehavi


University of British Columbia; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research

Erin M. Johnson


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

July 2013

NBER Working Paper No. w19242

Abstract:     
This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and financial incentives in physician induced demand (PID). Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable non-physicians. We exploit a unique institutional feature of California to determine how inducement varies with obstetricians' financial incentives. Consistent with PID, physicians are almost 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting of patients to hospitals or obstetricians. Financial incentives have a large effect on C-section probabilities for non-physicians, but physician-patients are relatively unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes, suggesting overuse of C-sections adversely impacts patient health.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49


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Date posted: July 19, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Erin and Rehavi, M. Marit and Johnson, Erin M., Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth (July 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19242. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2295856

Contact Information

Erin Johnson (Contact Author)
Wellesley College - Center for Research on Women ( email )
United States
M. Marit Rehavi
University of British Columbia ( email )
997-1873 East Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1
Canada
Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
180 Dundas Street West, Suite 1400
Toronto, Ontario
Canada
Erin M. Johnson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
77 Massachusetts Ave.
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

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