Merger Remedies in a Small Market Economy: Empirical Evidence from the Baltic States

Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 6:1 (2013): 1-26

26 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2013

See all articles by Alexandr Svetlicinii

Alexandr Svetlicinii

University of Macau - Faculty of Law

Külliki Lugenberg

Estonian Competition Authority - Konkurentsiamet - Merger Control Department

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

The paper represents a comparative study of the merger remedies practices of the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Based on comprehensive merger control data (2004-2011) and a comparative assessment of merger remedies imposed by the NCAs in the selected economic sectors (telecoms, alcoholic beverages, construction materials, trade in pharmaceuticals) the study identifies trends and tendencies of merger control that are characteristic for small market economies. Despite harmonization of national competition laws and enforcement practices with the EU rules and standards, the study highlights an obvious divergence from the EU guidance expressed in increasing acceptance of behavioral commitments. The results of the assessment indicate the need to develop more specific guidance on behavioral remedies that would better reflect the merger control realities of small market economies.

Keywords: EU competition law, merger control, merger remedies, national competition authority, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

Suggested Citation

Svetlicinii, Alexandr and Lugenberg, Külliki, Merger Remedies in a Small Market Economy: Empirical Evidence from the Baltic States (2013). Baltic Journal of Law & Politics 6:1 (2013): 1-26, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2296376

Alexandr Svetlicinii (Contact Author)

University of Macau - Faculty of Law ( email )

Macau

Külliki Lugenberg

Estonian Competition Authority - Konkurentsiamet - Merger Control Department ( email )

Auna 6, 10317
Tallinn
Estonia

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