Moral Coherence and Principle Pluralism

Abstract

This paper develops and defends a conception of moral coherence that is suitable for use in contexts of principle pluralism. I argue that, as they are traditionally understood, coherence methods stack the deck against pluralist theories, by incorporating norms such as systematicity – that the principles of a theory should be as few and as simple as possible. I develop and defend an alternative, minimal, conception of coherence that focuses instead on consistency. It's been suggested that consistency in this context should aim at the avoidance of conflict, but I argue against this: what matters is "case consistency," or judging consistently from one case to another. This means judging in accordance with morally relevant similarities and differences. I defend my proposal of minimal coherence from objections having to do with complexity and arbitrariness.

Keywords: moral coherence, moral conflict, dilemmas, pluralism, reflective equilibrium