The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law

51 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2000

See all articles by Francesco Parisi

Francesco Parisi

University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna; University of Miami, School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This paper considers the emergence and evolution of punitive and compensatory remedies in ancient law. I describe how ancient practices of retaliation gradually evolved, through four general phases, into rules requiring victim's compensation. I suggest that the Biblical lex talionis (eye for an eye ... life for a life) and similar rules that emerged in other ancient legal systems triggered an important change in the ancient law of wrongs, marking the end of a system of retaliatory justice and the emergence of a system based on victim's compensation. The paper addresses four related questions: (1) Why was a single limit of 1:1 to talionic penalties introduced across all categories of wrongdoing, replacing older customary practices which had different multipliers according to the circumstances of the case? (2) In the presence of imperfect enforcement, did the 1:1 limit to retaliation result in under-deterrence? (3) Why did the practices of literal talionis rapidly fall into disuse after their written formalization? and (4) Were the kofer and blood-money payments made under a threat of literal retaliation likely to generate over-extraction from the wrongdoer and excessive deterrence?

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco, The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law. American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2001, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 00-27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=229692 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.229692

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

University of Bologna ( email )

Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy

University of Miami, School of Law ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,787
Abstract Views
7,335
Rank
19,135
PlumX Metrics