Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the 'New' Europe

42 American Journal of Comparative Law 25 (1994)

60 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2013

See all articles by David J. Gerber

David J. Gerber

Chicago-Kent College of Law - Illinois Institute of Technology

Date Written: 1994

Abstract

Despite its enormous importance in the evolution of competition law in Europe, ordoliberal thought — and German neo-liberal thought generally — has received little attention in the English-speaking world, and it remains all but unknown in the United States. Moreover, except in Germany, awareness of these ideas has been confined almost exclusively to economists, while lawyers and political scientists have seldom been exposed to them. Finally, there has been little modern study of the impact of these ideas on the development of European thought.

In this article I address this critically important gap in our understanding of European thought and institutions. I seek to contribute to a fuller understanding of ordoliberal thought, particularly among non-German readers and among lawyers and policy analysts — to whom (together with economists) this body of thought has been addressed. In addition, I sketch the roles these ideas have played in the evolution of German and European legal thought and institutions, in general, and competition law, in particular.

Keywords: competition law, antitrust law, international law, comparative law, Europe, Germany, neo-liberalism, ordoliberalism, economics, legal systems

JEL Classification: K19, K21, K33, K42

Suggested Citation

Gerber, David J., Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the 'New' Europe (1994). 42 American Journal of Comparative Law 25 (1994). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2296981

David J. Gerber (Contact Author)

Chicago-Kent College of Law - Illinois Institute of Technology ( email )

565 W. Adams St.
Chicago, IL 60661-3691
United States

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