BITing Land Abroad: The Anti-Redistributive Impact of Bilateral Investment Agreements

43 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2013 Last revised: 29 Aug 2013

See all articles by Tomaso Ferrando

Tomaso Ferrando

University of Antwerp Law and Development Research Group and Institute of Policy Development

Date Written: July 24, 2013

Abstract

In this paper, I scrutinize the relationship between the some 3,000 BITs which have been concluded by now throughout the world, access to land and the plurality of proprietary regimes. In particular, I underlines three negative effects of the post-colonial system of investment law: It increases the bargaining power of investors nad facilitate the ongoing global land grabbing; it consolidates a proprietary regime based on private accumulation and public dispossession (included that of colonial origin); and in harnessing the possibility of a wide and effective land reform. In this light, governments and citizens have to understand the time and spacial effects of these bilateral international agreements, and the imminent need for a bold delink from a system that reinforces inequalities by prioritizing the economic rights of the investors to the rights and needs of people.

Keywords: land grabbing, bilateral investment treaties, investment arbitration, land reform, redistribution, sovereignty

Suggested Citation

Ferrando, Tomaso, BITing Land Abroad: The Anti-Redistributive Impact of Bilateral Investment Agreements (July 24, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2298224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2298224

Tomaso Ferrando (Contact Author)

University of Antwerp Law and Development Research Group and Institute of Policy Development ( email )

Venusstraat 23
Antwerp, 2000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uantwerpen.be/en/staff/tomaso-ferrando/

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