Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder Interventions

Research Handbook on Shareholder Power and Activism, in 231 (edited by Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).

UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 13-09

22 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2013 Last revised: 9 Dec 2016

Stephen M. Bainbridge

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: August 27, 2013

Abstract

This is a draft chapter for a forthcoming research handbook on shareholder power and activism. This chapter provides an analysis of shareholder activism based on the so-called director primacy model of corporate governance, which argues for a board-centric, rather than a shareholder-centric, understanding of corporate governance.

Even though the primacy of the board of director primacy is deeply embedded in state corporate law, shareholder activism nevertheless has become an increasingly important feature of corporate governance in the United States. The financial crisis of 2008 and the ascendancy of the Democratic Party in Washington created an environment in which activists were able to considerably advance their agenda via the political process. At the same time, changes in managerial compensation, shareholder concentration, and board composition, outlook, and ideology, have also empowered activist shareholders.

There are strong normative arguments for disempowering shareholders and, accordingly, for rolling back the gains shareholder activists have made. Whether that will prove possible in the long run or not, however, in the near term attention must be paid to the problem of managing shareholder interventions.

This problem arises because not all shareholder interventions are created equally. Some are legitimately designed to improve corporate efficiency and performance, especially by holding poorly performing boards of directors and top management teams to account. But others are motivated by an activist’s belief that he or she has better ideas about how to run the company than the incumbents, which may be true sometimes but often seems dubious. Worse yet, some interventions are intended to advance an activist’s agenda that is not shared by other investors.

This chapter proposes managing shareholder interventions through changes to the federal proxy rules designed to make it more difficult for activists to effect operational changes, while encouraging shareholder efforts to hold directors and managers accountable.

Keywords: corporate governance, corporation law, shareholders, voting rights, institutional investors

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Bainbridge, Stephen M., Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder Interventions (August 27, 2013). Research Handbook on Shareholder Power and Activism, in 231 (edited by Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015).; UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 13-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2298415

Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

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