State Responsibility for Bribe Solicitation and Extortion: Obligations, Obstacles, and Opportunities

44 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2013 Last revised: 2 Aug 2015

See all articles by Bruce W. Klaw

Bruce W. Klaw

University of Denver, Daniels College of Business; University of Denver, Daniels College of Business, Dept. of Business Ethics and Legal Studies

Date Written: September 20, 2013

Abstract

This Article explores how bribery and extortion in international business transactions and foreign direct investment may be prevented by holding States accountable under international law, improving the viability of investor-State arbitration for corruption claims, and making appropriate use of State-to-State dispute resolution mechanisms like diplomatic protection. It examines the content of States' obligations to prevent and eradicate corruption and considers the conditions and circumstances under which a State may be held responsible under international law for the solicitation and extortion of bribes from foreign investors and the denial of justice to foreign investors subjected to such corruption. It then assesses the opportunities and obstacles currently associated with invoking State responsibility through investor-State arbitration and State-to-State dispute resolution mechanisms such as diplomatic protection. Based on this analysis, it offers a series of suggested improvements that should better enable these international dispute resolution mechanisms to help prevent corruption by encouraging the disclosure of it, securing redress for foreign investors subjected to it, and holding States accountable for it.

Keywords: State responsibility, bribery, extortion, solicitation, corruption, prevention, international law, arbitration, diplomatic protection

Suggested Citation

Klaw, Bruce W., State Responsibility for Bribe Solicitation and Extortion: Obligations, Obstacles, and Opportunities (September 20, 2013). Berkeley Journal of International Law (BJIL), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2298886 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2298886

Bruce W. Klaw (Contact Author)

University of Denver, Daniels College of Business ( email )

2101 S. University Blvd.
Denver, CO 80210
United States

University of Denver, Daniels College of Business, Dept. of Business Ethics and Legal Studies ( email )

2101 S. University Blvd
Denver, CO 80208-8921
United States

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