Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony

61 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2013 Last revised: 28 Aug 2015

David L. Faigman

University of California Hastings College of the Law

John Monahan

University of Virginia School of Law

Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Date Written: August 27, 2013

Abstract

A fundamental divide exists between what scientists do as scientists and what courts often ask them to do as expert witnesses. Whereas scientists almost invariably measure phenomena at the group level, trial courts typically need to resolve cases at the individual level. A basic challenge for trial courts that rely on scientific experts, therefore, concerns translating scientific knowledge derived from studying groups into information that can be helpful in the individual cases before them (what this article refers to as “G2i”). To aid in dealing with this challenge, this article proposes a distinction between two types of expert evidence: framework evidence that describes general scientific propositions and diagnostic evidence that applies the general propositions to individual cases. It then examines the evidentiary implications of that distinction. Most importantly, admissibility standards for expert testimony should differ depending on whether experts are proffering framework or diagnostic evidence. Judicial analysis of “fit,” expert qualifications, testability, error rates, peer review, general acceptance, helpfulness and other traditional admissibility criteria for expert evidence will often vary, sometimes significantly, based on this distinction. The article provides general guidelines about the best practices judges should follow in sorting through these considerations. These guidelines will permit courts to manage G2i inferences in a more informed and coherent way than they do currently.

Suggested Citation

Faigman, David L. and Monahan, John and Slobogin, Christopher, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony (August 27, 2013). University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2014; Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2013-34; Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 13-47. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2298909 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2298909

David L. Faigman (Contact Author)

University of California Hastings College of the Law ( email )

200 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
United States

John Monahan

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-3632 (Phone)

Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

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