How Do Crime and Violence Impact Presidential Approval? Examining the Dynamics of the Mexican Case

34 Pages Posted: 29 Aug 2013

See all articles by Vidal Romero

Vidal Romero

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

In order to effectively fight criminal organizations, governments require support from significant segments of society. If citizens have a positive assessment of the executive’s job, the likelihood that they will report crimes, and act as allies in the fight, increases. This provides important leverage for incumbents, and allows them to continue their policies. Yet, winning the hearts and minds of citizens is not an easy endeavor. Crime and violence affect citizens’ most valuable assets: life and property. Thus, one would expect a close relationship between presidential approval and public security. What exactly is the relationship between public security and presidential approval? To generate robust answers to this question, and its multiple implications, we use Mexico as case study, and use data at both the aggregate and at the individual level. We find that approval levels are indeed affected by crime, but not by all crimes. Perhaps surprisingly, they are not affected by the most serious of crimes: homicide. At the individual level, we find that support for the mere act of fighting organized crime has a stronger effect on approval than actual performance on public security. We also find no effect of crime victimization on approval at the individual level.

Suggested Citation

Romero, Vidal and Magaloni, Beatriz, How Do Crime and Violence Impact Presidential Approval? Examining the Dynamics of the Mexican Case (2013). APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2299365

Vidal Romero (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7481 (Phone)

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