Institutional Variation and Election Fraud: An Analysis Using Observational and Experimental Data from Ukraine

39 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2014

See all articles by Fredrik M. Sjoberg

Fredrik M. Sjoberg

World Bank

Erik S. Herron

University of Kansas - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

Institutional rules not only influence the legitimate activities political actors pursue to win elections, but they also seem to influence illicit actions. We present a theory that focuses on how institutional rules relate to on-the-ground tactics of fraud. We test observable implications using a list experiment survey, crowdsourcing data, and fraud forensics from the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. We present evidence of vote manipulation, in the form of results falsification in the PR tier, and evidence of voter manipulation, in the form of vote buying in the SMD tier. We further document a preference of "boss" candidates to contest SMD elections, consistent with their incentives and capabilities to manipulate elections in plurality systems, as well as more vote buying in districts where the concentration of "boss" candidates is higher.

Keywords: Election Fraud, Proportional System, Plurality System, Crowdsourcing, List Experiments, and Fraud Forensics

JEL Classification: D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Sjoberg, Fredrik and Herron, Erik S., Institutional Variation and Election Fraud: An Analysis Using Observational and Experimental Data from Ukraine (2013). American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2299492 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2299492

Fredrik Sjoberg

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Erik S. Herron (Contact Author)

University of Kansas - Department of Political Science ( email )

1541 Lilac Lane
Lawrence, KS 66044
United States

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