Institutional Variation and Election Fraud: An Analysis Using Observational and Experimental Data from Ukraine

Abstract

Institutional rules not only influence the legitimate activities political actors pursue to win elections, but they also seem to influence illicit actions. We present a theory that focuses on how institutional rules relate to on-the-ground tactics of fraud. We test observable implications using a list experiment survey, crowdsourcing data, and fraud forensics from the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. We present evidence of vote manipulation, in the form of results falsification in the PR tier, and evidence of voter manipulation, in the form of vote buying in the SMD tier. We further document a preference of "boss" candidates to contest SMD elections, consistent with their incentives and capabilities to manipulate elections in plurality systems, as well as more vote buying in districts where the concentration of "boss" candidates is higher.

Keywords: Election Fraud, Proportional System, Plurality System, Crowdsourcing, List Experiments, and Fraud Forensics

JEL Classification: D72, D73