Supra-National Neo-Liberalism: EU Regulation of Economic Markets

Abstract

Since the 1980s the EU has developed a dominant set of neo-liberal ideas centred on competition policy to achieve the single European market. Although the neo-liberal content of the regulatory model is often taken for granted, it was not legally or institutionally inevitable. This paper argues that the resilience of neo-liberal ideas is best explained in terms of the interests and coalitions of actors. A powerful coalition of the Commission (and units within it), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), national governments and large firms formed to support the EU regulatory model, from which its members draw benefits. Questions to be explained include why this coalition formed and held together, since it is heterogeneous, unstable and sometimes changing, and why these actors embraced or accepted neo-liberal ideas as the means of pursuing their interests rather than alternatives centred on mercantilism, industrial policy and public service. To answer these questions, the paper takes account of the interaction between interests and the key features of neo-liberal ideas in the context of EU governance, including its ambiguity and diversity; its combination of removal of barriers to competition and re-regulation; its apparently politically neutral and technical mode of governance; its combination of a clear and apparently simple objective, competition, with institutional complexity.

Keywords: Regulation; neo-liberalism; competition policy; Europe; markets