Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2299619
 
 

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Interests, Institutions, and Climate Policy: A General Theory


Llewelyn Hughes


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Johannes Urpelainen


Columbia University

2013

Published as Llewelyn Hughes and Johannes Urpelainen, “Interests, Institutions, and Climate Policy: Explaining the Choice of Policy Instruments for the Energy Sector,” Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 54 (2015), pp. 52-63.

Abstract:     
What explains variation in the energy-related climate policies that nations implement? In this paper we present a theory of energy-related climate policy in democratic countries, emphasizing the distributional effects of policies on important energy-related industries, public sentiment, and the institutional capacity of governments, in determining energy-related climate policies implemented cross-nationally. As to the form of the policy, we expect the government to favor regulatory instruments over fiscal policies (taxes, subsidies) when it has enough institutional capacity in the relevant public agencies. For empirical evidence, we analyze national climate policies in four industrialized democracies: Australia, Germany, Japan, and the United States.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: energy policy, institutions, climate change


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Date posted: November 22, 2013 ; Last revised: August 14, 2015

Suggested Citation

Hughes, Llewelyn and Urpelainen, Johannes, Interests, Institutions, and Climate Policy: A General Theory (2013). Published as Llewelyn Hughes and Johannes Urpelainen, “Interests, Institutions, and Climate Policy: Explaining the Choice of Policy Instruments for the Energy Sector,” Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 54 (2015), pp. 52-63. . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2299619

Contact Information

Llewelyn Hughes (Contact Author)
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Johannes Urpelainen
Columbia University ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~ju2178
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