United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Conflict Peace

Abstract

How do the qualities of United Nations peacekeeping missions influence the duration of peace after civil wars? Previous work shows that UN peacekeeping extends the duration of peace, but does so with simple, dichotomous measures of intervention. We know little about how the differing personnel composition between and within UN missions influences their ability to guarantee peace. Rationalist bargaining models imply that peace breaks down because civil combatants face information asymmetries and commitment problems. We expect that the number and type of personnel deployed to a UN mission influences its ability to address these bargaining problems and guarantee peace. We analyze how the composition of missions influences the duration of peace, finding that as the number of UN military troops deployed increases, the chance of civil war recurring decreases. No other type of personnel has a similar effect on peace duration. These findings indicate that for the UN to best ensure peace, it should deploy UN military troops in large numbers to states in the aftermath of civil war.