Transforming Power Relations: Leadership, Risk, and Hope

46 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2013

See all articles by James H. Read

James H. Read

College of Saint Benedict (CSB) and Saint John's University (SJU)

Ian Shapiro

Yale University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

Longstanding, bitter communal conflicts resemble the prisoner’s dilemma of game theory: rational, self-interested political actors make choices that perpetuate the battle even if most people wish it resolved. Hopeful but politically risky acts of leadership that bridge communal divides are indispensable for transforming apparently zero-sum struggles into positive-sum outcomes. Such leaders implicitly view power itself in variable-sum terms: one needs an opponent strong enough to secure an agreement.

The hopeful, risk-accepting leadership of Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk in South Africa is illuminated through rational choice and transformational models of leadership, Thomas Schelling’s theorization of mixed-motive conflict, and Robert Axelrod’s work on the evolution of cooperation – especially his attention to interdependent preferences and restorative strategies. Mandela’s and de Klerk’s improbable accomplishment in dismantling apartheid without civil war is contrasted with less successful leadership episodes from Northern Ireland and Israel-Palestine, and with American slaveholders’ rejection of any compromise on slavery.

Keywords: Power, Prisoner's Dilemma, Leadership, South Africa, Northern Ireland, Palestinian Conflict, Robert Axelrod, Thomas Schelling, Josep Colomer, Nelson Mandela, F.W. de Klerk

Suggested Citation

Read, James H. and Shapiro, Ian, Transforming Power Relations: Leadership, Risk, and Hope (2013). APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2301064

James H. Read (Contact Author)

College of Saint Benedict (CSB) and Saint John's University (SJU) ( email )

P.O. Box 2000
St. Joseph and Collegeville, MN 56321
United States

Ian Shapiro

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States

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