Frame Effects and its Limits on Crime and Violence Policy Interventions: The Mexican War on Drugs

30 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2013

See all articles by Vidal Romero

Vidal Romero

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

Stanford University

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

In order to successfully battle organized crime, governments require a certain degree of citizens’ support. Governments are sometimes able to influence citizens’ opinions, but sometimes they are not. Under what circumstances do pro-government frames influence citizens’ opinions? Will individuals who are victims of crime be equally sensitive to frames than those who are not? We argue that crime victimization desensitizes citizens to pro-government frames. This further complicates governments’ fights against criminals, creating a vicious circle of insecurity, distrust, and frustrated policy interventions. To test our argument, we conducted a frame experiment embedded in a nationwide survey in Mexico. The empirical evidence supports our argument in most circumstances; yet, desensitization is moderated by low media-exposure and identification with the president’s party.

Keywords: Frame effects, persuasion, survey experiments, Mexico, crime, war on drugs

Suggested Citation

Romero, Vidal and Magaloni, Beatriz and Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Frame Effects and its Limits on Crime and Violence Policy Interventions: The Mexican War on Drugs (2013). APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2301141

Vidal Romero (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico

Beatriz Magaloni

Stanford University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-724-7481 (Phone)

Alberto Diaz-Cayeros

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
84
Abstract Views
765
Rank
633,030
PlumX Metrics