Power and Persuasion in Congressional Organization: An Analysis of Congressional Seat Transitions and Committee Assignments

Abstract

We propose a theory of committee organization that suggests congressional leaders increasingly attempt to encourage the partisan loyalty of rank and file members by providing members with access to institutional positions that grant lawmakers “distributive” policy opportunities and yield electoral benefits. Particularly when new members enter the legislature, leaders attempt to bestow committee assignments that will benefit freshman members electorally, and as a result, secure their partisan loyalty. Given the gravitation of representatives to committees that serve their interests, and vested interests in these committees that develop in districts over time, party leaders increasingly assign incoming legislators to the same committees and subcommittees as their predecessors when those assignments carry substantial electoral benefits. One possible, and unfortunate result of these changes may be an increase in partisan ranker in committees that traditionally enjoyed bipartisan cooperation.

The data examined identifies all vacated committee assignments over three decades between the 96th and 110th Congresses (1979-2008) were representatives exited congress to be replaced by a newly elected representative from the same congressional district. The analysis tests hypotheses that a) the likelihood that outgoing and incoming representatives from the same district were assigned to the same committee was higher for “constituency committee” assignments,[1] and b) the gradual centralization of power over the period in question has resulted in greater committee assignment succession by representatives from the same congressional district, especially with regard to constituency committee assignments. Finally, we speculate that these trends have contributed the kind of growing partisanship on constituency committees that would help to explain the demise of bipartisanship on issues where partisan agreement has traditionally been common.

Findings show that committee assignment succession, where exiting members of Congress are followed on the same committee by representatives elected from the same district, were significantly more likely for “constituency committees,” and that continuity of assignment to other committees is far less common when congressional seat transitions occur, providing robust support for arguments that constituency committees are composed of “high demand” legislators. Committee assignment succession appears especially frequent with regard to intra-party seat transitions. Finally our analysis shows that committee assignment succession increased following the Republican takeover of the House in 1994, and suggests these trends may be contributing to increased ideological divisions that occur along party lines within constituency committees. These findings provide support for the argument that a gradual increase in partisan influence has been accompanied by efforts to reward entering freshman legislators with beneficial assignments that will encourage partisan loyalty, and that increased partisan loyalty may be responsible for the demise of traditionally bipartisan policy making on constituency committees.