International Political Authority: Nuclear Nonproliferation and the IAEA in the 1990s

57 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2013

See all articles by Robert L. Brown

Robert L. Brown

Temple University Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has acquired the power to issues rules and commands on nuclear nonproliferation with which states expect they must comply. They comply when it defines “nonproliferation,” defines its implementation in “safeguards,” and judges state compliance with international nonproliferation treaties. I argue international organizations acquire political authority when they successfully overcome persistent barriers to international cooperation created by persistent policy and behavioral uncertainty to supply the collective outcomes demanded by states. The power of “authority” accounts for variation in the state-international organization relationship not explained by alternative theories. I find evidence of the demand for and supply of international political authority at the IAEA, which evolved from a limited agent at the end of the Cold War to become an international nuclear authority.

Keywords: international cooperation, nuclear nonproliferation, international organizations, IOs, authority, legitimacy

Suggested Citation

Brown, Robert L., International Political Authority: Nuclear Nonproliferation and the IAEA in the 1990s (2013). APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2301974

Robert L. Brown (Contact Author)

Temple University Department of Political Science ( email )

1115 West Berks Street
Gladfelter Hall 4th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States

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