International Political Authority: Nuclear Nonproliferation and the IAEA in the 1990s

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has acquired the power to issues rules and commands on nuclear nonproliferation with which states expect they must comply. They comply when it defines “nonproliferation,” defines its implementation in “safeguards,” and judges state compliance with international nonproliferation treaties. I argue international organizations acquire political authority when they successfully overcome persistent barriers to international cooperation created by persistent policy and behavioral uncertainty to supply the collective outcomes demanded by states. The power of “authority” accounts for variation in the state-international organization relationship not explained by alternative theories. I find evidence of the demand for and supply of international political authority at the IAEA, which evolved from a limited agent at the end of the Cold War to become an international nuclear authority.

Keywords: international cooperation, nuclear nonproliferation, international organizations, IOs, authority, legitimacy