11 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2013
Date Written: July 29, 2013
We follow the framework in Arya and Mittendorf (2011) but extend their analysis by investigating supplier(s)' equilibrium choices of disclosure or confidentiality regarding their contract terms with the downstream retailers. In the case of a common supplier, we find that the unique SPNE is for the supplier to choose disclosure. This private incentive is opposite to social incentive which calls for the regulator to choose confidentiality. In the case of dedicated suppliers, however, there are multiple SPNE due to coordination issues between the suppliers. The case which maximizes social surplus -- disclosure -- can be supported as a SPNE, together with the case of confidentiality which maximizes supplier profits at the cost of everyone else.
Keywords: Vertical market, Contract disclosure, Cournot competition
JEL Classification: D43, L13, L14
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Liu, Qihong and Wang, X. Henry, Private and Social Incentives for Vertical Contract Disclosure (July 29, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2302711 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2302711