Individual and Institutional Incentives for Party Development in the French Third Republic

32 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2013  

Alexandra E. Cirone

Columbia University

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

While parties are considered by many to be the linchpin of democratic politics, the path of their development is not a foregone conclusion in a new democracy { in some cases parties are \strong" and gain formal control over political activity, while other times parties remain fragmented and play much less of a role in politics. The real puzzle lies in the wide variation in the timing and progression of early party institutionalization across cases { when and why do incumbents build or strengthen formal party institutions in a nascent democracy? This paper analyzes individual legislator preferences behind key elements of party institutionalization, measured by support for constitutional reform bills and patterns of party affiliation. Using evidence from a historical dataset on the French Third Republic (1870-1940), I find that changes in constituency demographics and the system of cumul-des-mandates predict incumbent preferences for the timing and type of investment in political parties.

Suggested Citation

Cirone, Alexandra E., Individual and Institutional Incentives for Party Development in the French Third Republic (2013). APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper; American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2303060

Alexandra E. Cirone (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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