Ex Post Lobbying
48 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2013 Last revised: 2 May 2015
Date Written: November 3, 2014
Existing theories of lobbying do not fully explain lobbying that occurs after a final floor vote on a bill is taken. I show that nearly half of all lobbying activity targeting specific bills between 1998 and 2012 happened after the final vote. Ex post lobbying aims to influence the distribution of private benefits that will arise from legislation by targeting regulatory rulemaking processes that clarify non-specific parts of the bills. I develop a model that describes lobbying as a collective action problem among firms, who must trade off between spending money to lobby for a bill's passage and spending money to lobby over the details of its implementation. The model predicts that bills that have high proportions of nonspecific provisions draw more ex post lobbying and that trade associations and larger firms bear a disproportionately large share of the ex ante lobbying burden. Empirical analysis is consistent with these predictions.
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