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Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination?

Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds., "Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law" (Oxford University Press, 2013), Forthcoming

Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 13-27

33 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2013  

Patrick S. Shin

Suffolk University Law School

Date Written: July 1, 2013

Abstract

Is it possible to develop an account of the concept of discrimination that ties together the disparate strands of its reach in a morally cohesive way? In particular, can the various kinds of action that are standardly denominated as legal discrimination be thought to raise a united set of moral concerns? This chapter explores some moral explanations of certain familiar features of the legal notion of discrimination, with a view to investigating whether or how various standard instances of legal discrimination might be regarded as encompassed by a unitary moral concept.

Keywords: discrimination, discrimination theory, legal discrimination, moral discrimination, Title VII

Suggested Citation

Shin, Patrick S., Is There a Unitary Concept of Discrimination? (July 1, 2013). Deborah Hellman & Sophia Moreau, eds., "Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law" (Oxford University Press, 2013), Forthcoming; Suffolk University Law School Research Paper No. 13-27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2303903

Patrick S. Shin (Contact Author)

Suffolk University Law School ( email )

120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States
617-573-8182 (Phone)
617-305-3090 (Fax)

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