The Value of Duty

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 86, pp. 199-215, 2012

18 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2013

Date Written: July 1, 2012

Abstract

The obligations we owe to those with whom we share a valuable relationship (like friendship) cannot be reduced to the obligations we owe to others simply as fellow persons (e.g. the duty to reciprocate benefits received). Wallace suggests that this is because such valuable relationships are loving relationships. I instead propose that it is because, unlike general moral obligations, such valuable relationships (and their constitutive obligations) serve our normative interests. Part of what makes friendship good for us is that it involves bonds of loyalty. Our lives go better if we are bound to others in this way.

Suggested Citation

Owens, David, The Value of Duty (July 1, 2012). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 86, pp. 199-215, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2305359

David Owens (Contact Author)

Kings College London ( email )

Philosophy Building
The Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://davidowensphilosophy.wordpress.com/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
445
PlumX Metrics