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The Chilean Constitutional Court and the 2005 Reform: A Castling between Career Judges and Academics

Posted: 3 Aug 2013 Last revised: 11 Aug 2014

Diego G. Pardow

University of California at Berkeley, School of Law

Sergio Verdugo

New York University (NYU), School of Law, Students; Universidad del Desarrollo

Date Written: July 1, 2013

Abstract

Using an original methodology that mixes directional coding and Pritchett's correlations, this paper argues that the Chilean Constitutional Court is becoming more active in exercising its powers against the executive branch. We also argue, however, that any political analysis should proceed with caution. The trend has its origin in a constitutional reform in 2005 that substantially changed the mechanism to appoint the Court’s justices. However, the movement towards judicial activism seems to be related with the decreasing influence of the legalistic culture embodied in the Chilean judiciary and cannot be properly explained with classic attitudinal model.

Keywords: law & politics, judicial decision making, comparative constitutional law

JEL Classification: K19, K32, K42

Suggested Citation

Pardow, Diego G. and Verdugo, Sergio, The Chilean Constitutional Court and the 2005 Reform: A Castling between Career Judges and Academics (July 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2305426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2305426

Diego Pardow (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley, School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

Sergio Verdugo

New York University (NYU), School of Law, Students ( email )

New York, NY
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.nyu.edu/llmjsd/jsdprogram/jsdcommunity/sergioverdugo

Universidad del Desarrollo ( email )

Chile

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