Unfair Contract Terms - Effect of Collective Proceedings - C-472-10, Invitel

Forthcoming in Evelyne Terryn, Gert Straetmans and Veerle Colaert (eds.) Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Law – In Honour of Jules Stuyck (Intersentia, 2013)

20 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2013

See all articles by Stephanie Law

Stephanie Law

Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law

Fabrizio Cafaggi

Independent

Date Written: August 5, 2013

Abstract

This case note analyses the Invitel case, referred to the CJEU by the Hungarian Pest Megyei Bíróság, via the preliminary reference procedure, and places Invitel within the context of a line of recent CJEU jurisprudence concerning the assessment of contractual terms as to their unfairness and the interpretation of the provisions of the UCTD, where the main proceedings are brought not by an individual but in the public interest by a public, consumer protection body. The case note analyses certain dimensions of the case, including the relationship between the finding of invalidity and availability of an injunction, and the compatibility of a national system of collective effects with the UCTD, within the broader context of the effective judicial protection and enforcement of consumer rights.

Keywords: Unfair Contract Terms, Consumer Protection, Collective Proceedings

Suggested Citation

Law, Stephanie and Cafaggi, Fabrizio, Unfair Contract Terms - Effect of Collective Proceedings - C-472-10, Invitel (August 5, 2013). Forthcoming in Evelyne Terryn, Gert Straetmans and Veerle Colaert (eds.) Landmark Cases of EU Consumer Law – In Honour of Jules Stuyck (Intersentia, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2306024

Stephanie Law (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law ( email )

4, rue Alphonse Weicker
Luxembourg, L-2721
Luxembourg

Fabrizio Cafaggi

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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