An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control

17 Pages Posted: 6 Aug 2013

See all articles by Paul Hallwood

Paul Hallwood

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Thomas J. Miceli

University of Connecticut - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

Modern‐day piracy on the high seas poses a serious threat to international shipping. This paper develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between the efforts of pirates to locate potential targets, and shippers to avoid contact. Implementation of optimal enforcement policies is complicated by the need for international cooperation in the apprehension and prosecution of pirates. Free riding and other problems therefore impede the effectiveness of current international laws against piracy.

Suggested Citation

Hallwood, Paul and Miceli, Thomas J., An Economic Analysis of Maritime Piracy and its Control (September 2013). Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 60, Issue 4, pp. 343-359, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306457 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12014

Paul Hallwood (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Thomas J. Miceli

University of Connecticut - Department of Economics ( email )

365 Fairfield Way, U-1063
Storrs, CT 06269-1063
United States
860-486-5810 (Phone)
860-486-4463 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
240
PlumX Metrics