Public Good Provision, Punishment, and the Endowment Origin: Experimental Evidence

Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 56, 72-77, 2015

16 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2013 Last revised: 14 Mar 2016

See all articles by Armenak Antinyan

Armenak Antinyan

Wenlan School of Business; United Nations Development Program

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics; Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Daniel Neururer

University of Innsbruck

Date Written: March 26, 2014

Abstract

This paper studies contributions and punishments in a linear public good game, where group members have different sources of endowment. We compare the behavior of homogeneous groups, in which subjects are exogenously assigned the same endowments, with that of heterogeneous groups, in which half the group members have to exert effort to earn their endowments (effort subjects) and the other half are endowed with a windfall of equal value (windfall subjects).

If the opportunity to punish is absent, free-riding becomes the ubiquitous form of behavior over time both in homogeneous and in heterogeneous groups. If the opportunity to punish is present, contributions increase over time, although the two groups do not exhibit any differences in either the amount of contributions or the amount of punishment. Furthermore, effort and windfall subjects make similar contributions in heterogeneous groups.

Within the heterogeneous groups, over the entire time interval and conditional on the decision to punish, effort subjects punish (slightly) less severely than those who received windfall endowments.

Keywords: Endowment Origin, Linear Public Good Game, Punishment

JEL Classification: D63, H41, C91, C92

Suggested Citation

Antinyan, Armenak and Corazzini, Luca and Neururer, Daniel, Public Good Provision, Punishment, and the Endowment Origin: Experimental Evidence (March 26, 2014). Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 56, 72-77, 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306545 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2306545

Armenak Antinyan (Contact Author)

Wenlan School of Business ( email )

No.143, Wuluo Road
Wuhan, Hubei 430073
China

United Nations Development Program ( email )

Petros Adamyan 14
Yerevan, 0010
Armenia

Luca Corazzini

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Daniel Neururer

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universit├Ątsstra├če 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

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