The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law

21 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2013  

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: July 2013

Abstract

The common law process appears to have checks and balances that prevent the self-interest of a particular embedded actor (judge or lawyer) from having a substantial distortive effect. The question that follows is whether the Restatement project is also immune, to the same extent as the common law, from the self-interested incentives of actors involved in its creation. I argue that the Restatement process is far more vulnerable to distortion from self-interest than is the common law process.

Keywords: common law process, Restatement, rule of reason, common law efficiency, utilitarianism and common law, duty and negligence, strict liability, mutual combat

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K19, K39

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law (July 2013). Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 13-34; Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 13-34. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2307148 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2307148

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

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