European Union Lobbying and the Golden Cage of Post‐Socialist Network Capitalism in Hungary

17 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2013

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

The literature on business lobbying has shown that firms increasingly extend their interest representation activities from the domestic to the European level. Consequently, over the last 20 years, individual firms have become influential political actors in Brussels. Yet, after nine years of full membership, eastern European (EE) corporations stay away from EU‐level policy‐making. This article argues that the institutional structures emerging in post‐socialist countries constitute obstacles to firms developing the necessary capabilities for supranational lobbying. While firms in London and Brussels become increasingly professional in their lobbying strategies, large post‐socialist firms handle lobbying exclusively at the highest level of the organizational hierarchy through informal interpersonal networks. It is argued in the article that the confinement of lobbying strategy to the top echelon of corporate management reduces its effectiveness and scope. Consequently, EE companies are unable to integrate into EU lobbying.

Suggested Citation

Sallai, Dorottya, European Union Lobbying and the Golden Cage of Post‐Socialist Network Capitalism in Hungary (September 2013). JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 51, Issue 5, pp. 948-964, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2307385 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12029

Dorottya Sallai (Contact Author)

University of Greenwich ( email )

Old Royal Naval College
30 Park Row
London, SE10 9LS
United Kingdom
+44(0)2083319198 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.linkedin.com/in/dorottyasallai

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