Securities Fraud and Corporate Finance: Recent Developments

Managerial Decision and Economics, Forthcoming

32 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2013

See all articles by Xiaoyun Yu

Xiaoyun Yu

Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) - Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER); China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR)

Date Written: April 2013

Abstract

In this paper, I survey the recent research in corporate finance on financial securities frauds. I structure my review around three subjects in this literature: studies on internal and external factors that elicit managerial incentives for fraudulent activities, studies on regulatory and market-based mechanisms that help to deter or detect fraud and on what affects the efficiency of such mechanisms, and studies on the economic and social consequences of financial fraud. I outline the empirical challenges related to this line of research and discuss opportunities for future studies.

Keywords: corporate fraud, corporate governance, literature review

JEL Classification: G3, K42

Suggested Citation

Yu, Xiaoyun, Securities Fraud and Corporate Finance: Recent Developments (April 2013). Managerial Decision and Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2307587

Xiaoyun Yu (Contact Author)

Shanghai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) - Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance (SAIF) ( email )

Shanghai Jiao Tong University
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Shanghai, 200030
China

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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National University of Singapore (NUS) - Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) ( email )

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Singapore

China Academy of Financial Research (CAFR)

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Shanghai P.R.China, 200030
China

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