Bilateral Mechanism Design: Practical Contracting in Multi-Agency

Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research (CAEPR) Research Paper 2013-003

35 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2013 Last revised: 10 Jun 2016

See all articles by Yu Chen

Yu Chen

Nanjing University - School of Economics

Date Written: June 2, 2016

Abstract

We modelize and investigate the analytical rationale of employing bilateral mechanism design, which simplifies collective mechanism design by ignoring relative information evaluation, in generalized multi-agency contracting games under Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We permit interdependent valuations, contract externalities, correlated types, and heterogeneous or different message sets of different agents. The delegation principle under Bayesian Nash equilibrium identifies that bilateral Bayesian mechanism design can be translated to delegated Bayesian menu design without loss of generality. We take advantage of interim-payoff-equivalence to provide economically interesting conditions on the primitives for the full equivalence in which bilateral mechanism design can be substituted for collective mechanism design. Our analysis can also incorporate individual rationality constraints. Moreover, we discuss the approximation of full equivalence and the case allowing primitive constraints across the contracts for different agents.

Keywords: multi-agency, Bayesian implementation, mechanism design, menu design, delegation principle

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D86

Suggested Citation

Chen, Yu, Bilateral Mechanism Design: Practical Contracting in Multi-Agency (June 2, 2016). Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research (CAEPR) Research Paper 2013-003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2307597 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2307597

Yu Chen (Contact Author)

Nanjing University - School of Economics ( email )

Nanjing, Jiangsu 210093
China
8625-83621970 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://nubs.nju.edu.cn/en/index.php

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