Cross Border Abatement and Its Welfare Effects
24 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2013 Last revised: 18 Nov 2015
Date Written: November 5, 2015
This paper examines the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol and the mechanism’s welfare implications for the countries engaging in it. I use a simultaneous public good game, the public good being emission abatement, to asses the impact of the CDM on the emission abatement equilibrium and on the participating countries’ welfare. This paper considers three different cases. First, it presents a benchmark case without CDM. Then follow two cases with CDM, which differ in their cost functions: in one case a preferential right for emission abatement is granted to Annex I countries, in the other case it is granted to Non-Annex I countries. This paper finds that the CDM is welfare increasing, but welfare under the CDM depends on who is granted the preferential right.
Keywords: Private Provision of a Public good, Clean Development Mechanism, Abatement, Environmental Public Goods
JEL Classification: F53, H41, Q58
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation