Radical Epistemic Self-Sufficiency on Reed's Long Road to Skepticism
Philosophia, Vol. 38, pp. 789-793, 2010
7 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2013
Date Written: 2010
Baron Reed has developed a new argument for skepticism: contemporary epistemologists are all committed to two theses, fallibilism and attributabilism; unfortunately, these two theses about knowledge are incompatible; therefore, knowledge as conceived by contemporary epistemologists is impossible. In this brief paper I suggest that Reed's argument appears to rest on an understanding of attributablism which is so strong (call it maximal attributabilism) that it's doubtful many contemporary epistemologists actually embrace it. Nor does Reed offer any direct argument for the truth of maximal attributablism. Therefore, we need not be persuaded by Reed's new argument for skepticism.
Keywords: skepticism, fallibilism, attributabilism, Gettier, epistemic luck, epistemic self-sufficiency
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