Cartesian Skepticism and the Epistemic Priority Thesis

Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 40, pp. 573-586, 2002

14 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2013

See all articles by Brian Ribeiro

Brian Ribeiro

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga - Department of Philosophy & Religion

Date Written: 2002

Abstract

In Unnatural Doubts, Michael Williams argues that Cartesian skepticism is not truly an “intuitive” problem (that is, one which we can state with little or no appeal to contentious theories) at all. According to Williams, the skeptic has rich theoretical commitments all his own, prominent among which is the epistemic priority thesis. I argue, however, that Williams’s diagnostic critique of the epistemic priority thesis fails on his own conception of what is required for success. Furthermore, in a brief “Afterword” I argue that the later Wittgenstein (to whom Williams sometimes appeals) would concur with my critique of Williams’s antiskeptical efforts.

Keywords: Skepticism, Contextualism, Externalism, Epistemic Priority, Michael Williams, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Suggested Citation

Ribeiro, Brian, Cartesian Skepticism and the Epistemic Priority Thesis (2002). Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 40, pp. 573-586, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2308034

Brian Ribeiro (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga - Department of Philosophy & Religion ( email )

Department of Philosophy & Religion (#2753)
615 McCallie Ave.
Chattanooga, TN 37403
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.brian-ribeiro.com

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