Unions, Default Risk, and Pension Underfunding

4 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2013 Last revised: 8 Oct 2013

See all articles by Martin Cherkes

Martin Cherkes

NYU

Uzi Yaari

Rutgers University; School of Business-Camden

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 1986

Abstract

An explanation is provided for the following seemingly unrelated pieces of evidence concerning unions and pension plans in the United States: 1) The pension wealth of union members is greater than that of other workers, but 2) union pension plans are more often underfunded and 3) more likely to be terminated by default.

Keywords: pesion underfunding, unions, hold-up

JEL Classification: G3

Suggested Citation

Cherkes, Martin and Yaari, Uzi, Unions, Default Risk, and Pension Underfunding (August 1, 1986). Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 40, p. 239, 1988, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2308153

Martin Cherkes

NYU ( email )

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Uzi Yaari (Contact Author)

Rutgers University ( email )

School of Business
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United States
610-664-2086 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://camden-sbc.rutgers.edu/FacultyStaff/Directory/yaari.htm

School of Business-Camden ( email )

Rutgers University
227 Penn Street
Camden, NJ 08102
United States
610-664-2086 (Phone)
610-664-2198 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://camden-sbc.rutgers.edu/FacultyStaff/Directory/yaari.htm

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