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Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond

16 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2013 Last revised: 14 May 2014

J. Mark Ramseyer

Harvard Law School

Eric Bennett Rasmusen

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy

Date Written: October 6, 2013

Abstract

Antitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain how exclusive dealing could possibly cause harm, and have modelled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.

Keywords: Exclusionary conduct, exclusive-dealing, vertical restraints, anti-trust, Bork,The Antitrust Paradox

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Ramseyer, J. Mark and Rasmusen, Eric Bennett, Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond (October 6, 2013). Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 13-29. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2308218 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2308218

J. Mark Ramseyer

Harvard Law School ( email )

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Eric Bennett Rasmusen (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )

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