Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Ellman, Matthew; Wantchekon, Leonard

doi:10.2139/ssrn.230870

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Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 457

40 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2000

See all articles by Matthew Ellman

Matthew Ellman

Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Leonard Wantchekon

Princeton University

Date Written: August 1999

Abstract

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a "centrist" policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, "posturing" by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Keywords: Electoral Competition, Political Unrest, Asymmetric Information, Platform Divergence.

JEL Classification: D72, D82

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Ellman, Matthew and Wantchekon, Leonard, Electoral Competition Under the Threat of Political Unrest (August 1999). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 457, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=230870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.230870