Technology Diffusion with Learning Spillovers: Patent Versus Free Access

29 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2013

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

This paper analyses the interplay between technology diffusion and patent law. We develop a dynamic model where initial adoptions generate learning spillovers that reduce the cost of subsequent adoptions. In this setting, we contrast technology diffusion paths under competitive supply, subsidized adoption and patent protection. Competitive supply entails various coordination failures that cannot be fully fixed by public subsidy. We show that a patent holder can internalize externalities more efficiently, insofar as patent protection is fully effective. In contrast, fully competitive supply may be more efficient when patent enforcement is imperfect.

Suggested Citation

Glachant, Matthieu and Meniere, Yann, Technology Diffusion with Learning Spillovers: Patent Versus Free Access (September 2013). The Manchester School, Vol. 81, Issue 5, pp. 683-711, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2309847 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02337.x

Matthieu Glachant (Contact Author)

MINES ParisTech ( email )

60, boulevard Saint Michel
75272 Paris cedex 06, 75006
France
+33 1 40 51 9229 (Phone)

Yann Meniere

Mines-Paristech ( email )

60 Boulevard Saint-Michel
Paris, 75272
France

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