Piracy, Inc. On the Bearing of the Firm Analogy to Pirate Organization

8 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2013

See all articles by Per L. Bylund

Per L. Bylund

School of Entrepreneurship; Ratio Institute; Ludwig von Mises Institute

Date Written: November 8, 2009

Abstract

Peter T. Leeson’s The Invisible Hook provides an illuminating economic analysis of how pirates established governance structures regulating their organization. Leeson is successful in showing economic rationales for piratical institutions and adopts the view of the piratical enterprise as a for-profit business firm to further illustrate the point. This essay argues, however, that modern theories of the firm are not fully compatible with the nature of piratical organization. Rather, pirates seem to have suffered from problems much like those in traditional cooperatives, arising from organizing collective action and joint ownership of the means of production.

Suggested Citation

Bylund, Per L., Piracy, Inc. On the Bearing of the Firm Analogy to Pirate Organization (November 8, 2009). Review of Austrian Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2311221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2311221

Per L. Bylund (Contact Author)

School of Entrepreneurship ( email )

Oklahoma State University
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HOME PAGE: http://https://business.okstate.edu/directory/bylund-per-694946.html

Ratio Institute ( email )

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Sweden

Ludwig von Mises Institute ( email )

Auburn, AL
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HOME PAGE: http://mises.org/bylund

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