Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access

CIES Working Paper No. 7

23 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2000

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Will J. Martin

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2000

Abstract

Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, like OECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Round bindings on agricultural and services trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of "market access," emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round agricultural bindings.

Keywords: Expected Costs of Protection, Commercial Policy Uncertainty, Market Access WTO, Tariff Bindings.

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Martin, William J., Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access (February 2000). CIES Working Paper No. 7. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231234 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231234

Joseph F Francois (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW) ( email )

Oppolzergasse 6
A-1010 Vienna
Austria

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 5540 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

William J. Martin

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

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