Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access

Francois, Joseph F.; Martin, Will J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.231234

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Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access

CIES Working Paper No. 7

23 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2000

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Will J. Martin

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2000

Abstract

Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, like OECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Round bindings on agricultural and services trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of "market access," emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round agricultural bindings.

Keywords: Expected Costs of Protection, Commercial Policy Uncertainty, Market Access WTO, Tariff Bindings.

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Martin, William J., Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings and Market Access (February 2000). CIES Working Paper No. 7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231234 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231234