Market Structure, Trade Liberalization and the Gats

CIES Working Paper No. 3

25 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2000

See all articles by Joseph F. Francois

Joseph F. Francois

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW); University of Adelaide - School of Economics

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 2000

Abstract

In this paper we consider the impact of improved domestic market access for a foreign service provider. We emphasize the interaction between the different modes of market access commitments in services (cross-border and establishment) market structure, and regulation. We work with a model where the domestic industry is assumed to imperfectly competitive and, as a result of domestic regulation, able to act as a cartel. We also examine the incentives for the domestic firms to accommodate the entry of the foreign firm by inviting it to join the cartel.

Keywords: Services Trade, Trade Liberalization, Market Access, Imperfect Competition

JEL Classification: F12, F13, F23

Suggested Citation

Francois, Joseph F and Wooton, Ian, Market Structure, Trade Liberalization and the Gats (February 2000). CIES Working Paper No. 3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231239 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231239

Joseph F Francois (Contact Author)

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies (WIIW) ( email )

Oppolzergasse 6
A-1010 Vienna
Austria

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia
+61 8 8303 5540 (Phone)
+61 8 8223 1460 (Fax)

Ian Wooton

University of Strathclyde - Department of Economics ( email )

Sir William Duncan Building
130 Rottenrow
Glasgow G4 0GE
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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