Information Asymmetry and the Ex Ante Impact of Public Disclosure Quality on Price Efficiency and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from a Laboratory Market

Abstract

This paper examines the ex ante effects of public information quality on market prices and how such effects vary with information asymmetry among traders in a two-period experimental market. We vary public information quality by changing its precision and information asymmetry among traders by varying the distribution of private signals. We find high quality public disclosure leads to increased price efficiency and decreased cost of capital in the pre-announcement period when information asymmetry is high. The impending high quality public information increases the competition among informed traders, which leads prices to impound more private information and alleviates adverse selection problem facing uninformed traders. Our study suggests that building a high quality public information environment, e.g., by adopting a high quality accounting standards or following transparent disclosure policy is likely to provide ex ante benefits for firms with significant adverse selection among traders.

Keywords: public information quality, experimental markets, cost of capital, information asymmetry, adverse selection

JEL Classification: G14, C92