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Antitrust Enforcement and Sectoral Regulation: The Competition Policy Benefits of Concurrent Enforcement in the Communications Sector

Competition Policy International, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2013

9 Pages Posted: 22 Aug 2013  

Jonathan B. Baker

American University - Washington College of Law

Date Written: August 20, 2013

Abstract

The US competition agencies – the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – often share jurisdiction with sectoral regulators also charged with fostering competition, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). This article highlights how this institutional structure – concurrent jurisdiction – helps protect competition through the lens of recent US experiences involving the communications industry. It argues that concurrent jurisdiction is likely most effective when the communications regulator has independent access to industry information to limit capture, when the communications regulator can take a long-term perspective, when the antitrust agency can focus on competition as its sole goal, and when senior appointments at the two agencies are made with coordination between them in mind.

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L43

Suggested Citation

Baker, Jonathan B., Antitrust Enforcement and Sectoral Regulation: The Competition Policy Benefits of Concurrent Enforcement in the Communications Sector (August 20, 2013). Competition Policy International, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2313366

Jonathan B. Baker (Contact Author)

American University - Washington College of Law ( email )

4300 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
United States
202-274-4315 (Phone)

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