Why Do Firms Smooth Earnings?

55 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2000

See all articles by Anand M. Goel

Anand M. Goel

Stevens Institute of Technology

Anjan V. Thakor

Washington University, Saint Louis - John M. Olin School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


We develop a model that explains why the manager of a firm may smooth reported earnings by reducing its variability through time. Greater earnings volatility leads to a bigger informational advantage for informed investors over uninformed investors. If a sufficient number of current shareholders are uninformed and face some likelihood of trading in the future for liquidity reasons, then an increase in the volatility of reported earnings will magnify the trading losses these uninformed shareholders perceive. They will, therefore, want their firm's manager to produce as smooth a reported earnings stream as possible. Interestingly, it is a concern with long-term stock price performance rather than a preoccupation with the short-term performance that causes smoothing. Empirical implications are drawn out that link earnings smoothing to managerial compensation contracts, uncertainty about the volatility of earnings and the ownership structure.

JEL Classification: G34, M41, M43, J33

Suggested Citation

Goel, Anand Mohan and Thakor, Anjan V., Why Do Firms Smooth Earnings?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231489 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.231489

Anand Mohan Goel

Stevens Institute of Technology ( email )

Hoboken, NJ 07030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.anandgoel.org

Anjan V. Thakor (Contact Author)

Washington University, Saint Louis - John M. Olin School of Business ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

B-1050 Brussels

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