Stop-and-Go Agricultural Policies

Posted: 25 Jul 2000

See all articles by Jean-Marc Bourgeon

Jean-Marc Bourgeon

French National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) - UMR Economie Publique; Ecole Polytechnique - Economic Department

Robert G. Chambers

University of Maryland - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics

Abstract

The optimal design of farm policy and public investment in agriculture in the presence of asymmetric information between the government and farmers is studied. It is shown that a mix of capped deficiency payments and voluntary paid land diversion can implement the optimal policy outcome. Optimal program design requires large farmers to farm all their land, and small farmers may or may not divert acreage. Decoupled policies are never optimal.

JEL Classification: Q18

Suggested Citation

Bourgeon, Jean-Marc and Chambers, Robert G., Stop-and-Go Agricultural Policies. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231491

Jean-Marc Bourgeon

French National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) - UMR Economie Publique ( email )

Centre de Grignon
BP01
Thiverval-Grignon, 78850
France

Ecole Polytechnique - Economic Department ( email )

Palaiseau, 91128
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.polytechnique.edu

Robert G. Chambers (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics ( email )

2200 Symons Hall
College Park, MD 20742-5535
United States
301-405-1266 (Phone)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
532
PlumX Metrics